Cloud computing provides dynamically scalable resources provisioned as a service over networks. But untrustworthy cloud service provider (CSP) offers a big obstacle for the adoption of the cloud service since CSP can access data in cloud without data owner's permission. Hierarchical inner product encryption (HIPE) covers all applications of anonymous encryption, fully private communication and search on encrypted data, which provide trusted data access control policy to CSP. However, the existing works only achieve either selectively attribute-hiding or adaptively attribute-hiding under some strong assumptions in the public key setting. These schemes only support limited class of functions and can not protect the privacy of the query. To overcome these shortcomings, a novel HIPE in private key setting is issued. The proposed scheme achieves both fully secure and security reduction under the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption in the standard model. It has longer-size secret keys and size ciphertexts and brings the high computational complexity. Therefore, a variant of the basic scheme is presented with the same security but shorter ciphertexts.
Introduction
Cloud computing, a new computing paradigm, provides dynamically high-quality cloud-based services and applications over the internet. The cloud storage-based information retrieval service is a promising technology that will form a vigorous market. The cloud storage (service) providers are responsible for keeping the data available and accessible, and the physical environment protected and running. However, CSP is an authorised controller and access the data in anytime and anywhere without owner's permission. Hence the security and privacy protection are issued in cloud. Cryptographic method is considered at first. The contents are encrypted before storage in cloud. But the general encryption would not be suitable for cloud information retrieval systems because the CSP cannot retrieve encrypted contents from a plaintext query without the decryption private key. So the searching encryption is introduced in Boneh et al. (2004) . In this scheme, the entity performing the retrieval service is not allowed to learn the content of the queries and responses. And some additional encrypted index terms (serving as keywords) are used for the data search process. Recently, there are some schemes proposed in cloud, such as Benamara and Li (2015) , Dutu et al. (2014) , Ye and Khoussainov (2013) , and Thabet et al. (2014) .
Functional encryption (FE) (Boneh et al., 2011) is an advanced encryption and covers almost all typical encryption schemes, such as identity-based encryption (IBE) (Boneh and Franklin, 2001; Luo, 2015; Luo and Chen 2014) , attribute-based encryption (ABE) (Nishide et al., 2008; Wang and Li, 2013) , hidden vector encryption (HVE) (Shi and Waters, 2008) , inner-product encryption (IPE) (Park, 2011) . The relation ( , ) R v x in this scheme determines how to decrypt a ciphertext under parameter x with a secret key under parameter .
v Generally, attributehiding FE is called predicate encryption (PE) in Katz et al. (2008) . Recently, a strong security notion for PE is introduced in Katz et al. (2008) , which is called attributehiding. Under this encryption system, a ciphertext conceals all attributes as well as the plaintext. PE for IPE is a new way of viewing encryption which opens up a much larger world of possibilities for sharing encrypted data, such as Attrapadung and Libert (2010) , and Okamoto and Takashima (2009a , 2009b , 2011 . In an IPE system, a relation ( , ) R v x holds if 0.
x v ⋅ = The advanced functionality and flexibility provided by such systems is very appealing for many practical applications. There are two security notions for attribute-hiding FE, fully attribute-hiding and selectively attribute-hiding. In the fully attribute-hiding definition (Okamoto and Takashima, 2012) , adversary A is allowed to ask a key-query for v such that
x m b∈ are for the challenge ciphertext in the security definition). But in selectively attribute-hiding security definition (Okamoto and Takashima, 2009a) , A is only allowed to ask a key-query for v such that
In addition, it also supports delegation computation. Katz et al. (2008) gave an expressive attribute-hiding PE but no delegation mechanism. Okamoto and Takashima (2009b) introduced a new construction of hierarchical inner product encryption (HIPE) but the security proof was only given in the generic model. Okamoto and Takashima (2009a) proposed the first HIPE scheme that was selectively attribute-hiding security in the standard model under the RDSP and IDSP assumptions. After that, an efficient HIPE scheme was presented in , but the security was still proved in the selective model. More recently, Okamoto and Takashima (2012) presented a HIPE scheme that achieves full security under the standard d-linear assumption on prime order bilinear groups. However, they required that secret every subspace base with increasing the parameters and bringing a large amount of computational cost. It is a technically challenging task to achieve an adaptively secure and fully attribute-hiding HIPE scheme. Most recent constructions were issued from lattice (Abdalla et al., 2012; Hou et al., 2014) , but both schemes are selectively attribute-hiding security in the public key setting.
Our contribution
Our primary goal is to construct a scheme that hides both attributes and predicates supporting inner-products in the private key setting. Motivated by the above challenge, we propose a fully secure HIPE scheme in the private key setting under the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption. To achieve this point, we combine the techniques in and Takashima (2010, 2012) . Note that the vector space consists of four orthogonal subspaces, i.e., real encoding part, hidden part, secret-key randomness part and ciphertext randomness part. The proof employs a hybrid argument over a sequence of security games, which have been used in Lewko and Waters (2010) and Agrawal et al. (2013) . Considering the longer (O(n)-size) ciphertexts and (O( )-size) secret keys in the basic one, we presented a new scheme with the same security which achieves shorter (O(1)-size) ciphertexts.
Application of HIPE
With the development of cloud computing, and more and more data stored in the cloud server, how to find a specific file in a large number of documents has become a challenge, because the predicate encryption is suitable for data access control system and achieves the retrieval of encrypted data in cloud. Therefore, our system can be used for file retrieval systems. We give a specific application as shown in Figure  1 .
First, the data providers need to extract attribute vectors from the file to generate tokens and generate an encrypted file which is stored in the cloud service. When the file is used by data retrievers, only the predicate vector is provided to the server, and the server is calculated predicate f with attribute vectors x and predicate attribute vectors .
v The server sends encrypted files to data retrievers iff 0, x v ⋅ = otherwise, output special symbols ⊥.
New system can distribute the private key to the lower level files through the superior one to avoid the leakage of the circulation. Furthermore, its security can also guarantee the privacy of the file and the privacy of the retrieval, which is more natural than those already available.
Preliminaries

The DLIN assumption
Definition 1: The DLIN problem (Okamoto and Takashima, 2012) is to guess β ∈ {0, 1} given ( , , , ,
(1 ) : : ( , , , , ) (1 ), , , , ,
For a probabilistic machine ε, the advantage of ε for the DLIN problem is defined as:
The DLIN assumption holds if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary ε, the advantage
Definition of private key HIPE
the union is a disjoint union. Then, for 1 \{0},
is defined as follows: 1 ( , , ) 1
Figure 1 Application of HIPE (see online version for colours)
Definition 2: A private key HIPE (HIPE prv ) scheme for the class of hierarchical inner-product predicates over the set of hierarchical attribute Σ consists of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec and Delegate for = 1, …, d. They are given as follows:
• Setup: This algorithm takes as input security parameter 1 λ and format of hierarchy , n and outputs (master) secret key sk.
• KeyGen: This algorithm takes as input the master secret key sk and predicate vertors 1 : ( , , ) .
It outputs a corresponding secret key * . 
Security model
The full security in the private-key setting is similar to the adaptively attribute-hiding security model in the public-key setting is defined as follows (Okamoto and Takashima, 2012) .
1 Setup is run to generate keys sk.
2 A may adaptively makes a polynomial number of queries of the following type: A asks the challenger to an key for predicate (0) (1) ,
and challenge plaintexts (m (0) , m (1) ) subject to the following restrictions:
0 v x ⋅ ≠ for all the queried predicate vectors. b Two challenge plaintexts are equal, m (0) , m (1 ), i.e., one of the following conditions.
The adversary may continue to request keys for additional predicate vectors subject to the restrictions given in challenge. A is given the corresponding key * 1 ( , : ( , , )).
In the description of the scheme, we assume that the first coordinate, x 1 , of input vector, 1 : ( , , ),
is non-zero.
• Setup 1 (1 , : ( ; , , )) :
• KeyGen 1 1 1 1 1 ( ,( , , ): (( , , ), ,( , , ))):
,
: ) . : 
Security for private key HIPE
We first describe two intermediate schemes (HIPE 0 and HIPE 1 ) in the public-key setting, and show how the security of these schemes implies that the scheme HIPE prv is secure as well.
Theorem 1: The proposed HIPE prv scheme is fully secure against chosen plaintext attacks under DLIN assumption.
Proof: The proof of approach combines (Lewko and Waters, 2010; Agrawal et al., 2013) . Consider a public-key HIPE scheme HIPE 0 obtained by making a small modification to HIPE prv . The only difference is the setup phase of HIPE 0 :
is given by 0 0,1 0,3 0,5 ,1 , ,4 1 ,5 * * * * 0 0 , 1 0 , 3 , 1 , , 3 1 , 4:
( , , ), : ( , , ,
( , ), : ( , , , Lemma 1: The scheme HIPE 0 described above is a single challenge IND secure public-key HIPE scheme under the DLIN assumption.
Proof: Following Okamoto and Takashima's (2012) approach, we construct the same number of hybrids in the same way, where the only difference is that our ciphertexts and keys have some extra elements at the end. Then, we will show how the DLIN assumption can be reduced to both Problem 1' and Problem 2' via Basic Problem 0 defined in Okamoto and Takashima (2010) , where they also show how the DLIN assumption is reduced to this problem. 
Let * * * * * 0 0 , 1 0 , 3 0 , 4 0 , 5 * ,1 , , 3 1 , 5 : ( ,0,0,0, ) , : ( , ,0,0, ) ,
:
(0 , ,0 ) , 2, , . Finally, output an instance of Problem 1':
We can see that:
1 2 0, ,1 1 2 1 1, ,1 , , : ( ,0 ,0 ,0 , ) , : ( ,0 , ,0 ,0 , ) , : , 
Define the matrices Consider another public-key HIPE scheme HIPE 1 obtained by swapping the public and private key in HIPE 0 , i.e., The security of HIPE 1 follows from the security of HIPE 0 due to the symmetric nature of HIPE prv .
Lemma 2: The scheme HIPE 1 described above is a single challenge IND secure public-key HIPE scheme under the DLIN assumption.
Lemma 3: The scheme HIPE prv described above is a single challenge IND secure public-key HIPE scheme under the DLIN assumption.
Because Shen et al. (2009) describe how to construct a fully secure predicate encryption scheme supporting inner-products over vectors of length n from a single challenge secure scheme supporting inner-products over vectors of length 2n in Shen et al. (2009) . We adopt the same approach to obtain a fully secure scheme HIPE prv .
A variant of the proposed scheme
A variant of the proposed HIPE prv is proposed in this section. It achieves the same security as the above one and a shorter ciphertext than the first one. We assume that input vector, 1 ( , , ) x x has an index (1 1) t n ≤ ≤ − with 0, x ≠ and that input vector, 1 ( , , ) , v v satisfies 0. t n v ≠ Note that the random dual orthonormal basis generator (1) ob G is similar to Okamoto and Takashima (2011) , where N t := 5n t . for t = 1, …, d, 
: Theorem 2 can be proved to be similar to the Theorem 1. 
Efficiency analysis
In this section, we first compare the proposed HIPE with some existing schemes as shown in Table 1 . First, ours has high dimension of V. The schemes proposed in Okamoto and Takashima (2012) and ours (basic, modified) achieves fully attribute-hiding under the DLIN assumption, while the scheme in only has weak attribute-hiding under the n-extended decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. Second, the hierarchical technique is used in those schemes. The schemes proposed in obtain O(n 2 ) size public keys and secret keys, in Okamoto and Takashima (2012) obtain O(n) size public keys and secret keys, while ours achieve O(1) size public keys and O( ) size secret keys. In addition, ours (modified) achieves O(1) size ciphertexts, while others achieves O(n) size. Therefore, the new schemes have obvious improvement in efficiency.
Conclusions
In this paper, two private key HIPE are proposed. The first one achieves full security and security reduction under the natural assumption-DLIN assumption in the standard model. In addition, it has shorter public/private secret keys than the existing works. However, the ciphertexts achieves O(n) size. Hence the second one is proposed. It achieves constant size ciphertexts and keeps the same features as first one. For the future the research of the inner encryption on lattice has important significance.
